Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)

Abstract

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the leading framework for solving large imperfect-information games. It converges to an equilibrium by iteratively traversing the game tree. In order to deal with extremely large games, abstraction is typically applied before running CFR. The abstracted game is solved with tabular CFR, and its solution is mapped back to the full game. This process can be problematic because aspects of abstraction are often manual and domain specific, abstraction algorithms may miss important strategic nuances of the game, and there is a chicken-and-egg problem because determining a good abstraction requires knowledge of the equilibrium of the game. This paper introduces Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization, a form of CFR that obviates the need for abstraction by instead using deep neural networks to approximate the behavior of CFR in the full game. We show that Deep CFR is principled and achieves strong performance in large poker games. This is the first non-tabular variant of CFR to be successful in large games.

Latest Publications

Sustainable AI: Environmental Implications, Challenges and Opportunities

Carole-Jean Wu, Ramya Raghavendra, Udit Gupta, Bilge Acun, Newsha Ardalani, Kiwan Maeng, Gloria Chang, Fiona Aga Behram, James Huang, Charles Bai, Michael Gschwind, Anurag Gupta, Myle Ott, Anastasia Melnikov, Salvatore Candido, David Brooks, Geeta Chauhan, Benjamin Lee, Hsien-Hsin S. Lee, Bugra Akyildiz, Max Balandat, Joe Spisak, Ravi Jain, Mike Rabbat, Kim Hazelwood

MLSys - 2022