arXiv
Fisher markets are those where buyers with budgets compete for scarce items, a natural model for many real world markets including online advertising. We show how market designers can use taxes or subsidies in Fisher markets to ensure that market equilibrium outcomes fall within certain constraints. We adapt various types of fairness constraints proposed in existing literature to the market case and show who benefits and who loses from these constraints, as well as the extent to which properties of markets including Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility are preserved. We find that several prior proposed constraints applied to markets can hurt the groups they are intended to help.
Jialiang Wang, Daniel Scharstein, Akash Bapat, Kevin Blackburn-Matzen Matthew Yu, Jonathan Lehman, Suhib Alsisan, Yanghan Wang, Sam Tsai, Jan-Michael Frahm, Zijian He, Peter Vajda, Michael Cohen, Matt Uyttendaele
Yutian James Sun, Tim Meehan, Rebecca Schlussel, Wenlei Xie, Masha Basmanova, Orri Erling, Andrii Rosa, Shixuan Fan, Rongrong Zhong, Arun Thirupathi, Nikhil Collooru, Ke Wang, Sameer Agarwal, Arjun Gupta, Dionysios Logothetis, Kostas Xirogiannopoulos, Bin Fan, Amit Dutta, Varun Gajjala, Rohit Jain, Ajay Palakuzhy, Prithvi Pandian, Sergey Pershin, Abhisek Saikia, Pranjal Shankhdhar, Neerad Somanchi, Swapnil Tailor, Jialiang Tan, Sreeni Viswanadha, Zac Wen, Deepak Majeti, Aditi Pandit, Biswapesh Chattopadhyay
Yuming Du, Robin Kips, Albert Pumarola, Sebastian Starke, Ali Thabet, Artsiom Sanakoyeu
